Every other wallet in this project is a private key with unlimited authority over what it holds. This one is not. Its spending is delegated through an Altana session: an allowlist of contracts, a cap per day, and an expiry — enforced by the account contract, so a call outside the scope reverts before it runs. The session's key is registered in the on-chain KeyStore, which means you do not have to take any of this on our word.
A session that performs an allowed call proves the key works. It says nothing about whether the limits are attached. So both were run:
approve() on $U, signed by the session key, not by the admin key:transfer() of $U to an address of our own choosing, which is the exact move a stolen session key would make. The account rejected it with UnauthorizedCall. There is no transaction to link, because it never became one.Revocation is one transaction from the wallet's admin key, and it takes effect immediately — the entry above stops validating and the key vanishes from the list.
There is deliberately no revoke button on this page. A public endpoint that could end the session would be an off-switch for our agent that any stranger could press: a denial-of-service wearing the costume of a safety feature. The admin key is not on any worker, and the revocation runs from the operator's own machine:
node scripts/altana-session.mjs --mainnet --revoke --confirm
The visibility is the part that has to be public, and it is: anyone can call getKeys() and isValidKey() on the KeyStore and get the same answer this page shows, without asking us.
Raw: agent.brainonbnb.com/session · source at /source (scripts/altana-session.mjs, worker-agent/session.js).